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THE IMPACT OF MINORITY SET-ASIDE
PROGRAMS ON BLACK BUSINESS SUCCESS
IN CLEVELAND, OHIO: IMPLICATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY
DR. BESSIE HOUSE-SOREMEKUN*

INTRODUCfrON

Over the past few decades, African American entrepreneur
ship has become an increasingly important focus for scholars, politi
cians, public policy analysts, and economic development
practitioners, in terms of developing concrete strategies to assist en
trepreneurs to achieve economic success. This increasing interest in
minority entrepreneurship has been influenced by the tremendous
growth that has taken place in the African American-owned busi
ness sector. According to the 2002 census data, there are approxi
mately 1.2 million Black-owned businesses in the United States,
which represents an increase of forty-five percent since 1997. 1
One strategy that developed in the political arena as a tool to
enhance the survival of small, disadvantaged business enterprises,
many of which were owned and operated by African American en
trepreneurs, was the establishment of minority set-aside programs.
This Essay will examine the interrelationship between politics and
economics by studying the impact of minority set-aside programs
(also known as disadvantaged business programs) on the economic
outcomes of African American entrepreneurs. This study is partic
ularly important because of challenges in recent decades that have
emerged, both nationally and locally, against affirmative action pol

* Dr. Bessie House-Soremekun is the Public Scholar in African American Stud
ies, Civic Engagement, and Entrepreneurship at Indiana University-Purdue University
in Indianapolis. She is a professor of political science and African American and Afri
can diaspora studies. She is also the President, founder, and CEO of the National
Center for Entrepreneurship, Inc. and is an entrepreneur herself, having established
several for-profit and nonprofit business organizations. The author would like to thank
the Ohio Board of Regents for funding the research project on which this Essay is
based.
1. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Revenues for Black-Owned Firms Near
$89 Billion, Number of Businesses Up 45 Percent (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://
www .census.govlPress-Release/www/releases/archiveslbusiness_ownership/006711.html.
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icies, and by extension, minority set-aside programs. This study will
provide a historical and legal context to the current debate over the
survival of minority set-aside programs and will analyze their em
pirical impacts on Black business owners in Cleveland, Ohio.
I.

THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT FOR
SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS

The genesis for the development of minority set-aside pro
grams can be traced back to the 1930s when President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt first developed his New Deal programs to ad
dress economic problems that developed during the Great Depres
sion. 2 Roosevelt's Unemployment Relief Act of 1933 forbade
discrimination against individuals because of their "race, color, or
creed."3 Other New Deal programs, enacted by President
Roosevelt, also utilized this same language. 4 Harold L. Ickes, the
Secretary of the Interior, also ensured that, at least in theory, dis
crimination in Public Works Administration projects would also be
forbidden. 5 Requirements were set forth mandating that businesses
receiving federal contracts in cities with large Black populations
must hire a percentage of Black workers. 6 In spite of all of these
provisions, many employers and trade unions simply refused to
abide by the regulations.?
In June of 1942, A. Phillip Randolph and his associates lobbied
on behalf of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. S Others
joined in to call for the end of Jim Crow segregation in the U.S.
Armed Services units and in various defense plants across the coun
try.9 In response, President Roosevelt issued an executive order
that outlawed discrimination of workers in government or defense
industries on the basis of their national origin, color, race, or
creed.lO As Terry Anderson noted:
2. See Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Con
stitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1739 (2007).
3. Unemployment Relief Act, ch. 17, § 1, 48 Stat. 22, 23 (1933) (repealed 1966).
4. Terry H. Anderson, The Strange Career of Affirmative Action, S. CENT. REv.,
Summer 2005, at 110, 110.
5. !d.
6. Id.
7. !d. at 110-11.
8. Id. at 111-12.
9. !d.
10. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943); Anderson, supra note 4, at
111-12.
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[D]uring the Great Depression and two wars, race relations be
gan to change in America. Many began to think that all taxpay
ers should have the opportunity to jobs supported by their taxes,
in civilian or military life, and that concept was the foundation
for a policy that eventually became known as affirmative
action. 11

The civil rights movement, which began in Montgomery, Ala
bama, in 1955, drew national and international attention to the
plight of African Americans in the United States,12 "Numerous
events of the civil rights era, the language it embodied, the politics
of its broader implications, Rosa Parks becoming the Mother of the
modern civil rights movement, rhetoric, and the information that
gave meaning to the struggle served as symbols for the possibilities
yet to come."13 President John F. Kennedy was responsible for put
ting forth Executive Order 10,925, which mandated that govern
ment contractors utilize affirmative action to ensure that applicants
were provided employment and were treated fairly during their em
ployment periods without regard to their color, creed, race, or na
tional origin.14 This was the very first time that the government
used the term "affirmative action."15
There was a great deal of resistance to these executive orders
by various sectors of the American population. It was during the
administration of President Lyndon Johnson that the Civil Rights
Act of 196416 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 17 were passed. The
Civil Rights Act empowered the Attorney General's Office to en
sure that the basic provisions outlined in the Fourteenth Amend
ment to the Constitution were being adequately enforced.
Ironically, even though a Civil Rights Act had been passed in 1866,
it had not been adequately enforced; which is why the 1964 law was
11. Anderson, supra note 4, at 112.
12. Bessie House-Soremekun, Lessons from Down Under: Reflections on Mean
ings of Literacy and Knowledge from an African-American Female Growing Up in Rural
Alabama, in READERS OF THE QUILT: ESSAYS ON BEING BLACK, FEMALE, AND LITER
ATE 57, 58-59 (Joanne Kilgour Dowdy ed., 2005).
13. Id.
14. Exec. Order No. 10,925,3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963), superseded by Exec. Order
No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (2000).
15. Id.; THOMAS D. BOSTON, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BLACK ENTREPRE.
NEURSHIP 84 (1999); Anderson, supra note 4, at 114.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e).
17. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.).
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necessary.1 8 In particular, Titles II and III of the 1964 law 19 gave
the Attorney General's Office the power needed to enforce the de
segregation provisions mandated by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education. 20 This case successfully decimated the premise
behind the "separate but equal" arguments in America.21 Thus,
from this point on, African Americans would be able to attend edu
cational institutions that had previously been denied to them be
cause of their race. 22
Executive Order 11,246, which was put forth by President
Johnson and subsequently implemented in 1965, provided more
equality in the area of employment discrimination. 23 This Order,
and its subsequent amendments, mandated that any entity that re
ceived federal dollars for contracts in excess of fifty thousand dol
lars had to develop written affirmative action plans and utilize
principles of affirmative action in its recruitment and hiring prac
tices. 24 All of these programs helped to provide a climate condu
cive to the development of programs to assist African American
entrepreneurs. 25
When the Small Business Administration (SBA) was estab
lished in 1953, its initial focus was not on minority businesses per
se. 26 Instead, its primary interest was on small businesses in the
United States, most of which were owned by White entrepreneurs
at that timeY The SBA continued to grow and it became a perma
nent federal agency in 1958. 28 During this time period, one of the
main areas of focus for the Administration was on providing eco
nomic assistance in the form of loans to small businesses, as well as
assisting them in receiving federal contract dollars. 29
18.
19.
20.

Civil Rights Act of 1868, 42 U.S.c. § 1981.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 201-307.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. Id. at 495.
22. See BESSIE HOUSE-SOREMEKUN, CONFRONTING THE ODDS: AFRICAN AMERI
CAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 46 (2002). See generally LUCIUS J.
BARKER & MACK H. JONES, AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 107-08 (3d ed. 1994).
23. See Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 386 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended
in 42 U.s.c. § 2000e.
24. Id.; BOSTON, supra note 15, at 85.
25. See BOSTON, supra note 15, at 85.
26. Small Bus. Admin., About SBA, http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/index.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007).
27. [d.

28.
29.

Id.
[d.
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President Richard Nixon introduced Executive Order 11,458 in
March of 1969, which provided the foundation for the establish
ment of a national program to help minority-owned businesses. 3o
The Secretary of Commerce was charged with monitoring this pro
gram in order to develop processes at the federal, state, and local
levels to assist in the long-term development of minority firms.31
Thus, several leaders of federal departments had to provide reports
to the Secretary of Commerce to explain their plans to achieve pos
itive outcomes. 32 The end result was the establishment of the Of
fice of Minority Business Enterprise. 33
The Small Business Act created the famous 8(a) program in
1969, which provided for the use of federal contracts to companies
owned by "economically disadvantaged individuals."34 While it is
true that this law was not specifically designed for African Ameri
cans at this time, as Timothy Bates has so eloquently argued, "the
language of 'socially or economically disadvantaged' entrepreneurs
being eligible for 8(a) program assistance, however, opened the
door to participation by minority entrepreneurs, whose incomes ac
tually exceeded those associated with a poverty level of
existence. "35
Billions of dollars have been awarded to minority entrepre
neurs over the years.36 The passage of the Public Works Employ
ment Act of 1977,37 as well as the Omnibus Small Business Act of
1978,38 helped to establish realistic goals with regard to procure
ment dollars and contracts for minority businesses. This legislation
mandated that about ten percent of all federal contracts awarded
for local public works projects had to be given to minority business
enterprises. 39
30. Exec. Order No. 11,458,3 C.F.R. 779 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 631 (2000).
31. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 11.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations,
13 C.F.R. § 124.101 (2007); see Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, § 8(a),
67 Stat. 232 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. § 637).
35. Timothy Bates, The Impact of Preferential Procurement Policies on Minority
Owned Businesses, 14 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 51, 53 (1985).
36. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 11.
37. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28,91 Stat. 116 (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6708, 6710).
38. Small Business Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-633, 636, 637, 644).
39. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 11, 33.
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The State and Local Level of Analysis

Ohio House Bill 584 created minority set-aside programs in
1980.40 This bill "stipulated that '5% of the aggregate value of all
state construction contracts and 15% of the aggregate value of state
procurement contracts each fiscal year had to be set aside for bid
ding upon by minority business enterprises only."'41 The law also
required that state construction contracts provided for about seven
percent of the overall value of the contract to be awarded to minor
ity subcontractors, service providers, and material men unless the
Set Aside Review Board modified or changed the requirement. 42
Ohio's definition of "minority business enterprises" was business
entities in which a minimum of fifty-one percent of the company
was "owned and controlled" by Ohioans who were from "economi
cally disadvantaged groups."43 This included Latinos, Asian Amer
icans, African Americans, and Native Americans. 44 In order to
participate, the owner had to demonstrate ownership of the firm for
at least one year before the participation application was filed. 45
B.

The Impact of the Fullilove and Croson Cases

Minority set-asides have increasingly come under attack over
the past few years in the wake of bigger challenges to the basic
principles of affirmative action. 46 A number of court cases were
launched on the basis of "reverse discrimination" claims. In Fulli
love v. Klutznick,47 the Supreme Court clearly articulated its contin
uing support of earlier legislation passed by the U.S. Congress,
which stipulated that state and local governments that applied for
grant awards under the category of the Public Works Act of 1977
must demonstrate that at least ten percent of the grants would be
used for contracts with minority enterprises. 48 Thus, Fullilove con
tinued the government's trend of using past discriminatory behavior
40.

H.R. 584, 113th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1980).
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences Splits Michigan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al (discussing controversy over Michigan's ballot initia
tive to limit affirmative action and set-aside programs).
47. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (the majority's position was re
ceded from in Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and considered overruled in Doe
v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998)).
48. Id. at 448; BOSTON, supra note 15.
41.
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as a basis for continuing to support minority set-asides as a remedy
in the minority-owned business sector. As the Supreme Court up
held the ten percent set-aside program, it focused on the rather
broad power of Congress to redress the societal impacts of past dis
criminatory behavior. 49
The famous City of Richmond v. Croson 50 case, however,
opened the door for the introduction of numerous lawsuits against
minority set-aside and procurement programs all over the country.
Much of the progress that had resulted from the implementation of
Fullilove was negated by the Croson case. In particular, Croson
attacked the minority set-aside program that had been established
by Richmond, Virginia. Richmond's program required thirty per
cent of contracts awarded by the city to be set aside for bids from
minority contractors in response to a record of past discrimination
in terms of the number of contracts that had been awarded to mi
norities. 51 White contractors challenged the basis for having such a
program and were able to receive support from the Reagan admin
istration,52 which favored the use of a strict scrutiny test. As
Thomas Boston has noted, when discussing the Croson's majority
decision:
All classifications based on race, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
argued, whether benefiting or burdening minorities or non
minorities will be subject to strict scrutiny....
. . . On this issue Justice Marshall dissented. He argued that
this standard should be applied to those classifications that dis
criminate against minorities but not those designed to eliminate
past discrimination ....
[Following Croscn, the] distinction between the powers of
federal, state and local agencies to implement racial mandates
was dissolved in the June 1995 Supreme Court decision in the
case of Adarand Constructors v. Pena and the u.s. Department of
Transportation. The Supreme Court ruled in a five-to-four vote
that strict scrutiny must be the standard of review for race-based
programs of the federal government as well. In making this
shift, the Court voided all previous rulings that interpreted the
49.
50.
51.
52.
488 U.S.

BOSTON, supra note 15.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
BOSTON, supra note 15, at 34-35.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Croson,
469 (No. 87-998), available at 1988 WL 1025715 (Westlaw).
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equal protection clause of the constitution as having a different
application at different levels of government. 53

As a result of the Croson case and various other factors, mi
nority set-aside programs were overturned in several American
cities, including Cleveland, Columbus, Atlanta, Miami, and Phila
delphia. 54 Ballot initiatives were also passed in Washington and
California, which eliminated several programs that provided assis
tance to racial, ethnic, and gender groups.55
Federal courts in Ohio have also been ambivalent towards
their treatment of affirmative action and set-aside programs in the
past few decades. In 1982, Judge Kinneary was responsible for
striking down the Minority Business Enterprise Act of 1980 in re
sponse to a case brought by a White contractor. 56 The Sixth Circuit,
however, reversed this decision one year later, arguing that minori
ties had been affected by discriminatory behavior that existed in the
procedure used in Ohio's purchasing and contract policies. 57
In 1996, Ohio governor, George Voinovich, established a "So
cially and Economically Disadvantaged Business Policy."58 Eco
nomic disadvantage focuses on analyzing the relative and personal
wealth of the business owner. Social disadvantage, on the other
hand, includes traditional minority groups, as well as individuals
who are disadvantaged because of physical disability, color, gender,
ethnicity, or because they live in an area with a high unemployment
rate.
State Magistrate Rita Bash Eaton ruled in October 1996 that
Ohio should provide affirmative action awards using economic
need as a criterion, rather than only race. 59 She stressed that Ohio's
Minority Business Enterprise program was unconstitutional when
race-based criterion excluded individuals who had experienced eco
53. BOSTON, supra note 15, at 36, 38.
54. Mitchell F. Rice, State and Local Government Set-Aside Programs, Disparity
Studies, and Minority Business Development in Post-Croson Era, 15 J. URB. AFF. 529,
534 (1993).
55. Id.
56. Ohio Contractor's Ass'n v. Keip, No. C-2-82-446 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 1982)
(striking down Ohio's Minority Business Enterprise Act of 1980, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 123.151 (West 1980)), rev'd, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Associ
ated Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabnik, 214 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2000).
57. Ohio Contractor's Ass'n, 713 F.2d at 173; see Joe Hallet, Ohio's Race-Based
Contracts 'Unlawful': Need Should Count for More than Ethnicity, Says, Magistrate,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 31, 1996, at 1A.
58. Rice, supra note 54, at 534.
59. Hallet, supra note 57.
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nomic hardship or disadvantage. 6o The Ohio Supreme Court voted
unanimously in April 1999 that a certain portion of Ohio's state set
aside programs for minority contractors was constitutiona1. 61 Cur
rently, the set-asides for construction are considered invalid, while
programs for goods and services are still allowed. The data indicate
that minorities and women received between $15 and $18 million in
contracts from Cuyahoga County in 1999 under the aegis of its
Equal Economic Opportunity Program. 62
The Cuyahoga County Equal Economic Opportunity Program
was finally repealed by the Cuyahoga County Commissioners in
January of 2000. 63 This program had been made possible by a 1993
resolution that required contractors and suppliers to use minority
subcontractors when making bids. 64 One of the most noticeable ef
fects of this repeal is that women and minorities are still eligible to
bid for county contracts, but the previous requirement that major
ity-owned firms were compelled to do business with minority
owned firms is no longer in place. An interim program was put in
place as several organizations in Ohio commissioned other corpora
tions to perform disparity studies for particular industries. 65 The
data from these studies will be important in future discussions on
minority set-aside programs. 66
60. Id.
61. Ritchey Produce Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs., 707 N.E.2d 871 (Ohio
1999).
62. Albert C. Jones, Commissioners Shut Out Minority Bidders, Repeal 1993
Equal Opportunity Program, CALL & POST (Cleveland), Jan. 26,2000, at 1A.
63. Id.

64.
65.

ld.
Id.

66. John Nolan, Appeals Court Rejects Ohio's Contract Program for Minorities,
CALL & POST (Cleveland), June 8, 2000, at 6B. According to Mitchell Rice, disparity
studies are also known as predicate studies or discrimination studies. One major pur
pose of these studies is to provide information on the extent to which a previous locale
has discriminated against minorities, with particular emphasis on business and eco
nomic discrimination. Rice, supra note 54, at 536. In the case of Cleveland, a consor
tium of various entities in the city, including the Cleveland Municipal School District,
the Board of Cuyahoga County Commissioners, the Cuyahoga Community College
District, the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, and the Cleveland
Cuyahoga County Port Authority, have announced that they were uniting their efforts
to have a disparity study performed by Mason Tillman Associates Ltd. and W.S. Wil
liams Ph.D. Inc. See 4 MASON TILLMAN Assocs., MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DISPARITY
STUDIES: CLEVELAND-CUYAHOGA COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY DISPARITY STUDY
(2003). According to material advanced by the various organizations involved in the
study, "[i]ndustries considered were construction, architecture and engineering, profes
sional services, and goods and other services for fiscal years January 1, 1998, to Decem
ber 31, 2000. Mason Tillman performed the disparity studies to assess whether requisite
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AFRICAN AMERICAN BUSINESSES IN CLEVELAND, OHIO,
RESEARCH STUDY

A.

Research Design and Methodology

Research was performed by studying African American entre
preneurs in Cleveland, Ohio, and its eastern suburbs from the
spring of 1998 to the summer 2000. Ohio Board of Regents funded
this study with a two-year grant of $64,000. Cleveland was selected
for the location of the study because it is a large urban area with a
sizable African American population. The study focused on small
businesses, which can generally be defined as enterprises that are
not dominant entities in their areas of concentration. Small busi
nesses are also characterized as entities in which the owners usually
invested relatively small amounts of capital at the onset of the busi
ness, usually hired less than 500 employees to work in their firms,
and although there was a considerable variation in the sample, usu
ally earned less than $100,000 per year in profits. Four major types
of businesses were included: manufacturing, construction, retail or
trade, and services. Businesses that did not fit into these areas were
placed in an "unclassified category," which included promotion
(i.e., marketing), real estate, distribution, and finance.
The main focus of the data-collection process centered on de
veloping a database of African American entrepreneurs who re
sided in the geographically-targeted areas identified above. This
process proved to be a major challenge because no definitive list
currently exists in northeast Ohio that includes the names, ad
dresses, and phone numbers of all African American entrepre
neurs. Hence, several different strategies were utilized. One
strategy was to develop a list of the names of all of the Black-owned
businesses, which were included in The Cleveland Black Pages that
were located in our geographically specified area of focus. There
were some challenges to using this strategy such as the fact that
participation in this publication is voluntary, and therefore, some
entrepreneurs were not included.
A second strategy was to compile a list of the entrepreneurs
that were included in the Certified Minority Business lists from the
Ohio Department of Development and the City of Cleveland.
These lists included names of businesses in which fifty-one percent
or more of the company was owned by African Americans, Native
factual conditions exist pursuant to Croson v. Richmond guidelines to justify MBEIFBE
[minority business enterprise and female business enterprise] Programs." Id. at i.
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American, Latinos, or Asian Americans. The major barrier to us
ing this approach was that there was no scientific way to determine
the ethnicities of the entrepreneurs. Hence, letters were sent out to
all everyone included on the list, which included the owners of 544
firms. Phone calls were made to the owners to encourage them to
participate in the study as well as to explain the purpose of the
study. Efforts were made to determine the probable universe of
African American entrepreneurs on the broader "minority business
list." Statistical census data was used to determine the probable
number of African Americans residing in the target area. Because
African Americans constitute about forty percent of the population
in the geographical area of focus for this study, forty percent of the
total number of owners on the minority business list was taken,
which included about 217 owners. One hundred thirty-six entrepre
neurs participated in this study, which was a response rate of sixty
three percent. Of these, five owners were a part of the pretest, one
entrepreneur's response was used for narrative purpose only, and
statistical analysis was performed on the remaining 130 business
owners. The study included data on both successful and unsuccess
ful businesses. To test the hypotheses advanced in this study, an
swers to specific questions on the survey were used relating to the
independent and dependent variables identified in the hypotheses
selected for analysis, which are discussed later in this Essay.
B.

Hypotheses Selected for Analysis

1. Entrepreneurs Who Have Participated in, or Benefited
from, Minority Set-Aside Programs Are More Successful
than Their Nonparticipating Counterparts
The hypothesis-that entrepreneurs participating in minority
set-aside programs should experience greater levels of success than
their nonparticipating counterparts-was based on previous studies
performed by Timothy Bates and Thomas Boston. These studies
argue that receipt of minority set-aside contracts led to business
success for Black business owners.67 This hypothesis tested that
proposition. To measure the independent variable, data was taken
from the questionnaire regarding whether the entrepreneurs had
participated in minority set-aside programs. The dependent varia
ble was measured by using the number of years the business had
been in operation and profits. In determining how success would
67.

BOSTON, supra note 15, at 92; Bates, supra note 35, at 61.
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be measured, previous works of other scholars in the field were uti
lized. However, the number of years in operation was the main
dependent variable because more independent variables in the
larger study on Black-owned businesses were correlated to longev
ity than to any of the other dependent variables.
2.

Entrepreneurs Who Are in Certain Types of Industry
Areas Would Participate More in Minority Set
Aside Programs

The rationale for the hypothesis, that entrepreneurs who are in
specific types of industry areas would participate more in minority
set-aside programs than those in other vocations, is that earlier
studies performed by Timothy Bates indicated that owners of con
struction companies were some of the major benefactors of minor
ity set-aside programs. 68 Here, this proposition is examined by
looking at African American entrepreneurs in Cleveland, Ohio.
The independent variables were the industry areas of service, con
struction, retail or trade, and manufacturing. The dependent varia
ble was whether owners participated in minority set-aside
programs.
3.

Owners Who Have Higher Levels of Education Should
Participate More in Minority Set-Aside Programs

The rationale for the hypothesis-that owners who have higher
levels of education should participate more in minority set-aside
programs-is that Timothy Bates's previous studies demonstrated
that the entrepreneurs' education affected their ability to achieve
economic success. 69 Here, we examined the impact of education on
an entrepreneur's ability to participate in, or benefit from minority
set-aside programs. The independent variable was the level of edu
cation of Black business owners who participated in minority set
aside programs.
4.

Older Business Owners Should Participate More in
Minority Set-Aside Programs

The rationale for the hypothesis, that older business owners
should participate more in minority set-aside programs, is that
Timothy Bates's earlier studies found that economic success was
68.
69.

BOSTON, supra note 15, at 29; Bates, supra note 35, at 58.
Bates, supra note 35, at 57.
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positively correlated with the age of the business owners.7° Here,
we looked at the impact of the age of the entrepreneur on partici
pating in, or benefiting from minority set-aside programs. The in
dependent variable was the age of Black business owners. The
dependent variable was whether the owners participated in minor
ity set-aside programs.
C.

Demographic Data on the Entrepreneurs

In order to be eligible to participate in Ohio's set-aside pro
grams, entrepreneurs had to be certified with the State of Ohio, the
City of Cleveland, or other agencies that provided certification ser
vices. Although 67% of the African American business owners in
this study felt that the impact of the minority set-aside programs
had been positive, only 31 % of them were actually certified.
Hence, 69% of the entrepreneurs were ineligible to participate in
these programs even though the data from this study demonstrates
that participating in set-aside programs offered positive and mea
surable benefits to the business owners.
When cross tabulations were performed to compare the demo
graphic characteristics of the Black entrepreneurs who participated
in minority set-aside programs versus those who did not, the follow
ing results emerged. Seventy-three percent of the participants in
the set-aside programs had businesses that were located in the city
of Cleveland, rather than its suburbs, and most (75%) of them were
men, rather than women. 71 About 77% of the participants were
married and about 80% owned corporations.72
Twenty-five percent of the participants were between the ages
of 31 and 40; 27% were between 41 and 50; and 34% were between
51 and 60, with very small percentages in other age categories.
About 48% of the entrepreneurs who participated had earned un
dergraduate degrees or higher, while another 32% had attended
some university classes. 73 Fifty-nine percent of the businesses
earned less than $100,000 per year in profits, while 24% earned be
tween $100,000 and $249,999. The largest number of participants
owned service-related businesses. The number of years that partici
pants' businesses had been in operation varied considerably, with
21 % having been in business for 1-5 years; around 32% for 6-10
70.
71.
72.
73.

/d. at 60
See infra
See infra
See infra

tbl.2.
tbls.1-2.
tbls.3-4.
tbl.6.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

32

[Vol. 30:19

years; 14% for 11-20 years; 11.35% for 21-25 years; and 11.35% for
26-30 years.7 4
D.

Testing the Hypotheses

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions and Logistical Re
gressions were used to test the hypotheses advanced in this Essay.
In performing the OLS Regressions for this Essay, the following
methodology was followed. The author examined the predictive
ability of the independent variable with the dependent variables to
ascertain if multi-colinearity existed between the independent vari
able on the dependent variables in Table 10.75 OLS Regressions
analyze causation rather than correlation. Because the author indi
cated which variables were independent and which were depen
dent, the following results emerged:
For the hypothesis set forth in Part II.B.l, the results of the
OLS Regressions indicate a positive and significant relationship be
tween participating in, or benefiting from, minority set-aside pro
grams and economic success, when success is measured by years in
operation and total profits per year. Therefore, this hypothesis was
supported by the data.7 6
The hypothesis detailed in Part II.B.2 postulated that entrepre
neurs in certain industry areas participate more in minority set
aside programs. This hypothesis was supported because the data
from Table 11 indicate that there was a positive and significant rela
tionship between having a construction business and participating
in, or benefiting from, minority set-aside programs.77
However, the hypothesis announced in Part II.B.3 was not sup
ported by the data. This hypothesis posited that entrepreneurs with
higher levels of education participate more in minority set-aside
programs.78 Finally, the hypothesis discussed in Part II.BA argued
that older entrepreneurs should participate more in minority set
aside programs. This hypothesis was also not supported by the
data. 79
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

tbl.9.
tbl.10.
tbl.10.
tbl.1l.
tbl.1l.
tbl.1l.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the findings presented here demonstrate that af
firmative action programs, and by extension minority set-aside pro
grams, appear to have a positive and empirical impact on the
success of Black business owners. The data from this study indicate
that the relationship between participation in minority set-aside
programs and economic success is positive and significant, regard
less of how success is measured. In other words, when other vari
ables in the study are controlled, entrepreneurs who received
minority set-asides were more successful than those who did not.
Two measures of success were used: the number of years the busi
nesses had been in operation and the total profits per year. The
results of this research project thus validate the importance of keep
ing these types of programs in place. However, the results
presented here should also be examined in the context of other is
sues that emerged from this study. For example, a larger number of
African American entrepreneurs need to understand the impor
tance of becoming certified minority and female business owners
and need to complete the certification process. The data indicate
that only a small minority of Black-owned businesses in Cleveland
are certified even though the data from the study overwhelming
demonstrate that entrepreneurs who did participate in these pro
grams are more successful than those who do not.
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GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF BLACK RESPONDENTS

WHO HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM,
MINORITY SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Geographic Location

Percentage

Shaker Heights

7.0

Cleveland

73.0

Maple Heights

2.0

Cleveland Heights

5.0

East Cleveland

2.0

Euclid

2.0

Warrensville

2.0

Beachwood

2.0

South Euclid

5.0

TABLE

2.

GENDER OF BLACK RESPONDENT WHO HAVE BEEN A
PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY
SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Gender

Percentage

Male

75.0

Female

25.0

TABLE

3.

MARITAL STATUS OF BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO

HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY
SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Marital Status

Percentage

Single

11.35

Married

77.3

Separated
Divorced
Widowed



11.35
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CLASSIFICATION OF BLACK-OWNED BUSINESSES WHO

HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM,
MINORITY SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Classification

Percentage

Sole Proprietorship

20.5
-

Partnership
Corporation

TABLE

5.

79.5

AGE OF BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN A
PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY
SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS

Percentage

Age
20-30 Years

4.6

31-40 Years

25.0

41-50 Years

27.1

51-60 Years

34.1

61-70 Years

4.6

71-80 Years

2.3

Over 80 Years

2.3

TABLE

6.

LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF BLACK RESPONDENTS

WHO HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY
SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS

Education

Percentage

Less than High School

2.3

High School

9.1

Some College or University
Associate or Vocational Degree

31.8
9.1

College Degree

34.1

Post Graduate Degree

13.6
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TOTAL PROFITS IN DOLLAR TERMS PER YEAR OF

BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR
BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Percentage

Profits
Less than $40,000

38.1

$40,000-$99,000

21.4

$100,000-$249,000

23.8

$250,000-$499,000

7.1

$500,000-$749,000

4.8

$750,000-$999,999

-

$1,000,000-$4,999,999

4.8

$5,000,000-$9,999,999

-

Over $10,000,000

-

TABLE

8.

TYPE OF BLACK-OWNED BUSINESSES WHO HAVE

BEEN APART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY
SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Type of Businesses

Number of Businesses

Construction

11
2

Man ufacturing

25

Services
Retail

5

Other Businesses

5

TABLE

9.

YEARS IN OPERATION FOR BLACK RESPONDENTS WHO

HAVE BEEN A PART OF, OR BENEFITED FROM, MINORITY
SET-AsIDE PROGRAMS

Years in Operation
Less than 1 Year

Percentage
2.3

1-5 Years

20.5

6-10 Years

31.8

11-20 Years

13.6

21-25 Years

11.35

26-30 Years

11.35

More than 30 Years

9.1
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Variable (Independent
Variables)

10. OLS

REGRESSIONS

Years in Operation
(Dependent Variable)

Total Profits Per Year
(Dependent Variable)

Whether They Had Been
Part of, or Benefited from,
a Minority Set-Aside
Program

0.606**
(0.235)

0.473*
(0.248)

Age of the Business Owner

0.612***
(0.104)

0.131
(0.109)

Gender of the Business
Owner

0.168
(0.249)

0.255
(0.267)

Highest Level of Education
Attained

0.221 **
(0.075)

0.106
(0.079)

Constant (a)

0.358
(0.461)

1.017*
(0.487)

Adjusted R2

0.299

0.045

Standard Error

1.2912

1.3099

14.520***

2.387*

F
N

127.0

37

117.0

Sources: Original telephone interview schedule, spring 1998 through summer 2000.
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. SO
*P<0.05 **P<O.01 ***P<O.OOI
·Years in operation is the main dependent variable model.
***Although 136 entrepreneurs participated in the study, the size of the Ns in Table 1 vary
for each dependent variable based on how many of the entrepreneurs answered the
question on the questionnaire regarding the number of years their business had been in
operation and the amount of their business profits in U.S. dollars per year.

80. In this Essay, the author reports nonstandardized regression coefficients
rather than standardized values. Here, she adopts the methodological approach
advocated in Gary King, How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoiding Common Mistakes in
Quantitative Political Science, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 672 (1985). King argues that
standardized coefficients are harder to interpret and do not necessarily provide
information that could help to compare the effects from different explanatory variables.
Moreover, standardized coefficients may provide unreliable or misleading information.
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LOGISTICAL REGRESSIONS

Independent Variables

Dependent Variable (Whether They Had
Been a Part of, or Benefited from,
Minority Set-Aside Programs)

Gender of Business Owner

0.02181
(0.097)

Age of the Business Owner

0.0232
(0.039)

Level of Education Attained by the
Owner

0.02076
(0.028)

Type of Business
Services

-0.0169
(0.131)

Construction

0.380**
(0.149)

Manufacturing

0.08442
(0.192)

Retail

0.02169
(0.131)

Constant (a)

-1.62
(0.200)

Adjusted R2

0.022

Standard Error

0.4838

F

1.404

N

128.0

Sources: Original telephone interview schedule, spring 1998 through summer 2000.
Note: Entries are nonstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis.
*P<0.05 **P<O.01 ***P<0.001

